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NOTES
DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INTER PARTES
REVIEW AT THE PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD
Xinni Cai*
The inter partes review (IPR) is an administrative procedure conducted by
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an adjudicative body within the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). IPR provides an opportunity
for third parties to challenge a patent’s validity after it has already been
granted. A petitioner can file a petition with the PTAB to “institute” IPR. If
the review is instituted, the PTAB considers the evidence presented and
issues a final written decision, either holding the patent valid or striking it
down as invalid. Although IPR was introduced as an alternative to litigation,
it is often used alongside litigation. In response to this dual track, the PTAB
has introduced a practice of exercising discretion in determining whether to
institute or deny institution of an IPR.
The PTAB’s discretionary-denial practice uses the NHK-Fintiv factors,
established in two precedential PTAB decisions, that allow the PTAB to
consider the progress of a parallel court proceeding in its decision whether
to institute. The PTAB’s use of these factors has created controversy and
uncertainty for stakeholders, who have found it difficult to predict whether
the PTAB will exercise its discretion, and whether their valuable patents may
be deemed invalid as a result.
This Note argues that the PTAB has exceeded its statutory authority in its
practice of discretionary denial, and that the U.S. Supreme Court should bar
this practice. Furthermore, this Note argues for legislative reform that
would not only allow the PTAB to consider evidence of the resources already
expended in a parallel litigation, but would also prohibit the consideration
of circumstances such as scheduled trial dates, which are often subject to
change. The proposed action would restore stability and confidence in the
PTAB’s IPR procedure.

* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2015, Boston College.
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INTRODUCTION
The patent system recognizes innovation, celebrating ingenuity and
creativity by rewarding an inventor who displays these qualities with
economic gain. The necessity of such a system was recognized by the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution, who explicitly gave Congress the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”1 In exercising this power,
Congress established the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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which, among other responsibilities, handles both the grant of patents2 as
well as several post-grant administrative procedures for invalidating
improperly granted patents.3 One such procedure is the inter partes review
(IPR), which is conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), a
body within the USPTO that conducts adjudicative proceedings.4
IPR was originally introduced to target problems arising from patent
trolls,5 but its usage has widely exceeded expectations.6 In many respects,
the IPR procedure is conducted like litigation, but differs in one important
aspect: it is much more accessible than litigation, being both cheaper and
faster.7 Due to its accessibility, IPR has become the “most popular post grant
procedure” available at the USPTO.8 At the same time, IPR has also been
highly criticized for being unfairly unfavorable toward patent owners.9
The IPR procedure has recently drawn attention due to the PTAB’s
introduction of a practice of exercising its discretion when determining
whether to institute review, beginning in 2019.10 When considering a
petition for IPR, the PTAB now considers both the factors laid out in its
organic statute,11 as well as external factors known as the NHK-Fintiv
factors.12 The statutory factors include, for example, the amount of effort
already invested in a parallel litigation, as well as any overlap in issues
between the IPR proceeding and the parallel litigation.13 The PTAB has
drawn its authority to exercise discretion from 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which
states that the “Director may not authorize an inter partes review” unless there
is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail.14
2. General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 14,
2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/general-information-patents [https://perma.cc/
3W5W-NF27].
3. What Are AIA Proceedings, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 13, 2021, 3:57 PM),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab/what-are-aiaproceedings [https://perma.cc/C7SC-FB8Z].
4. Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/
ptab/trials/inter-partes-review [https://perma.cc/N4UP-NDZX] (June 21, 2022, 10:47 AM).
5. Patent trolls, or non-practicing entities, are entities that hold patent rights but do not
make, use, or sell their inventions. Instead, they use their patents to threaten litigation against
companies that may potentially infringe their patents in order to extract settlements. See infra
notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
6. Robert Stoll, A Review at Five Years of Inter Partes Review, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 12,
2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/12/five-years-inter-partes-review/
id=87424/ [https://perma.cc/XP9E-S9NZ].
7. See infra notes 69–72.
8. See Stoll, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. Matthew Bultman, Turning Away a Patent Challenge: The NHK-Fintiv Rule
Explained, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 3, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/iplaw/turning-away-a-patent-challenge-the-nhk-fintiv-rule-explained [https://perma.cc/NU6WHQLE].
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added). The PTAB has interpreted the word “may” here
to mean that the agency has discretion in deciding whether to institute IPR. See infra Part
II.A.2.
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The PTAB’s exercise of discretion has created much uncertainty for both
petitioners and patent owners alike, as it has become difficult to predict when
and how the PTAB will exercise its discretion.15 As a result, several parties
have unsuccessfully filed petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
to have the procedure reviewed,16 the USPTO has requested comments for a
rulemaking to codify or change the PTAB’s practice of considering the
NHK-Fintiv factors,17 and a bill to eradicate the use of the factors has been
proposed in Congress.18 Regardless of the outcome of the pending
challenges, it is clear that some change to the policy—either formalizing the
procedure or eradicating it—will be needed to bring stability and trust back
to the PTAB’s post-grant administrative proceedings.
This Note will explore in depth the PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial
and will ultimately propose a solution to address the uncertainty caused by
the current practice. Part I.A will introduce the patent practices and
post-grant proceedings at the USPTO, and Part I.B will focus on the IPR
procedure in particular. Part II will explain the current practice of the
PTAB’s discretionary denial of IPR using the NHK-Fintiv factors. Lastly,
Part III will consider how the NHK-Fintiv factors should be treated going
forward to reduce uncertainty in post-grant administrative proceedings.
I. POST-GRANT PROCEDURES AT THE PATENT OFFICE:
INTER PARTES REVIEW
The IPR procedure was introduced in the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act19 (AIA), passed in 2011, which brought about the largest overhaul of the
patent system since 1952.20 Part I.A discusses the basics of the patent system
and the history behind the passage of the AIA. Part I.B discusses the IPR
procedure in more detail, including the statutory criteria for institution and
conduct of the procedure by the PTAB. Part I.C introduces the administrative
law principles necessary to analyze the legality of the PTAB’s use of the
NHK-Fintiv factors when considering whether to institute IPR.
15. Joseph Matal, PTAB Discretionary Denials Are Unpredictable and Illegal, LAW360
(Dec. 13, 2021, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1448126/ptab-discretionarydenials-are-unpredictable-and-illegal [https://perma.cc/JQG9-Y9Q6]; NHK-Fintiv Rule
Pushes District Court Defendants to File More Ex Parte Reexaminations, RPX RATIONAL
PAT. (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.rpxcorp.com/data-byte/nhk-fintiv-rule-pushes-districtcourt-defendants-to-file-more-ex-parte-reexaminations/ [https://perma.cc/K5K2-BRRE].
16. Apple Inc. v. Optis Cellular Tech., LLC, No. 2021-1043, 2020 WL 7753630 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 21, 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 859 (2021) (mem.); Intel Corp. v. VLSI Tech.
LLC, No. 2021-1614, 2021 WL 5968443 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
1363 (2021) (mem.).
17. Request for Comments on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, 85 Fed. Reg. 66502, 66502 (Oct. 20, 2020).
18. Dani Kass, Leahy’s Bill Seeks to ‘Course Correct’ from Iancu’s PTAB, LAW360
(Sept. 27, 2021, 10:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1424694/leahy-s-bill-seeks-tocourse-correct-from-iancu-s-ptab [https://perma.cc/D9RR-GHTU].
19. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
20. ALLEN BRUFSKY, BARRY KRAMER & ROBERT L. KELLY, 25 WEST’S LEGAL FORMS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.4 (2021).
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A. Basics of the Patent System and Patent Administrative Procedures
A patent is a property right in an invention that is granted to the inventor
by the USPTO, an administrative agency within the U.S. Department of
Commerce.21 The USPTO awards patents to inventors who fulfill the
statutory requirements set by Congress,22 and the patent lasts for twenty
years.23
To acquire a patent, a patent applicant must first file an application with
the USPTO that includes a written description of the invention, as well as a
set of claims.24 The claims define the invention for which patent protection
is sought, while the written description supports those claims by providing a
detailed explanation of what the invention is.25 When examining patent
applications, the USPTO looks to the statutory criteria outlined in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. Section 101 establishes patentable subject matter
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”26 Sections 102 and 103
provide criteria that a patent application must meet to be considered novel
and nonobvious, respectively.27
These inquiries usually involve
interrogating the body of information that was publicly available at the time
of filing28 and determining whether the patent applicant’s claims are truly
new and a significant improvement over the existing “prior art.”29 Sections
102 and 103 define what types of references can be considered by the patent
office when examining a patent application.30 References known as prior art
considered during patent examination include previously published patent
applications, granted patents, articles, databases, websites, internet
publications, and public statements related to the invention.31 Sections 102
and 103 also allow the USPTO to consider whether the invention was on sale
or in public use prior to the filing of the patent application.32 Prior art is then
compared to the applicant’s claims to determine if said claims are sufficiently
new and nonobvious.33 Section 112 provides the requirements that the

21. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 2; see also infra notes 36–38
and accompanying text.
22. About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us
[https://perma.cc/QX7V-GNWG] (June 16, 2022, 11:01 AM).
23. The default lifetime of a patent is twenty years. However, this lifetime can be
extended in certain circumstances, such as by patent term extension or patent term adjustment.
See, e.g., MPEP § 2710 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.
25. MPEP § 608.01, (k).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
27. Id. §§ 102–103.
28. Id. § 102.
29. Id. § 103.
30. Id. §§ 102–103.
31. UNDERSTANDING PRIOR ART AND ITS USE IN DETERMINING PATENTABILITY,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
May%20Info%20Chat%20slides%20%28003%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BRJ-L2BL].
32. MPEP § 2152.02(c) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
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written application has to meet for the patent to be granted.34 The
requirements include some substantive legal queries, such as whether the
patent applicant has provided enough information to demonstrate that they
actually invented the subject matter claimed, and whether the application
discloses enough information to enable others to practice the claimed
invention.35
The main benefit of possessing a patent is receiving the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the claimed
invention.36 The patent does not grant an affirmative right to practice the
invention.37 Instead, holding a patent allows the owner to sue competitors
for infringement and prevent others from entering the same space.38
In addition to granting patents, the USPTO can also review patents through
a body within the USPTO known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.39
The PTAB handles appeals of patent applications that have been denied40
and provides procedures for invalidating granted patents.41 There are several
different procedures available at the PTAB for invalidating granted patents,
some of which have changed over time.42
Prior to the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011,43
the two procedures available for invalidating patents were ex parte
reexamination44 and inter partes reexamination.45 Ex parte reexamination
was implemented by Congress in 1980 and was designed to grant the USPTO
a broader opportunity to review patents of questionable validity.46 The
procedure was presented as an alternative to litigation.47 An additional
benefit of ex parte reexamination was that, if conducted prior to litigation,
the ex parte reexamination decision could be used by courts to defer the

34. Id. § 112.
35. Id.; see also MPEP §§ 2161–2164.
36. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 2.
37. Id.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
39. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab [https://perma.cc/VQW6-XTF3] (Aug. 15, 2022, 4:55
PM).
40. New to PTAB?, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/patenttrial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab/new-ptab [https://perma.cc/XDX7-7XPW] (July 27, 2022,
2:29 PM).
41. See infra notes 45, 65–66 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. Note that the AIA changed the name of the PTAB. Before the AIA was passed, it was
known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. PTAB was the name assigned by
the AIA. See New to PTAB Archived, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
patents/ptab/ptab-inventors [https://perma.cc/M649-XHSP] (Aug. 13, 2021, 4:02 PM).
44. Greg Reilly, The Justiciability of Cancelled Patents, 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253,
267–68 (2022).
45. Peggy P. Ni, Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557,
563–64 (2016).
46. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in
Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 55–56 (2016).
47. Id.
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question of patent validity to the expertise of the USPTO.48 Ex parte
reexamination allowed the USPTO to reconsider the novelty or
nonobviousness of the patent based only on printed prior art and under a
preponderance of the evidence standard.49 The procedure is similar to the
initial patent examination in that it only involves the patentee and the
examiner; there is no third-party involvement in ex parte reexamination.50
One major drawback of the ex parte reexamination was that it excluded any
third-party participation beyond filing the initial request.51 In fact, 29 percent
of ex parte reexaminations between July 1981 and September 2014 were filed
by the patent owner themselves, likely using the procedure as a mechanism
to strengthen the patent.52 Despite its drawbacks, the ex parte reexamination
procedure is still available at the USPTO today.53
On the other hand, inter partes reexamination was later introduced by
Congress in 1999 and was designed to coexist with the ex parte procedure.54
Inter partes reexamination attempted to address the limitations of ex parte
examination by allowing third parties to participate in the procedure.55
However, due to various other drawbacks of the procedure of inter partes
reexamination, it was never widely used as a means for challenging the
validity of patents.56
While ex parte and inter partes reexamination were low-cost options
available for invalidating patents, they were unpopular and slow, with some
reexaminations taking up to thirty-eight months to reach a final decision.57
Since the use of these pre-AIA procedures were limited, third parties still
relied on costly litigation to initiate patent challenges.58 The lack of low-cost
options for invalidating patents became a serious concern for companies and
courts due to the prevalence of patent infringement suits brought by
non-practicing entities (NPEs).59 NPEs are patent holders that do not make,
48. Id.
49. Reilly, supra note 44, at 267–68.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Vishnubhakat, supra note 46, at 57. Certain Federal Circuit cases at the time had
indicated that patents that survived reexamination should be viewed by the courts with more
deference than ordinary patents. Id. at 57 n.52.
53. MPEP § 2209 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020). Although it is much less popular
than the IPR, ex parte reexamination is also still used by some patent challengers. See, e.g.,
NHK-Fintiv Rule Pushes District Court Defendants to File More Ex Parte Reexaminations,
RPX RATIONAL PAT. (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.rpxcorp.com/data-byte/nhk-fintiv-rulepushes-district-court-defendants-to-file-more-ex-parte-reexaminations
[https://perma.cc/TFU8-SX6H].
54. Vishnubhakat, supra note 46, at 58.
55. Ni, supra note 45, at 563; Vishnubhakat, supra note 46, at 57.
56. Vishnubhakat, supra note 46, at 57.
57. Ni, supra note 45, at 563–64.
58. See Dennis Crouch, Chief Judge Rader:
Improving Patent Litigation,
PATENTLYO
(Sept.
27, 2011),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patentlitigation.html [https://perma.cc/P2Z7-UMUJ]. Chief Judge Randall Ray Rader noted that one
of the main drivers of cost in patent litigation was the high cost of discovery, even though
fewer than one out of every 10,000 pages disclosed actually resulted in a trial exhibit. Id.
59. Ni, supra note 45, at 562.
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use, or sell patented products and instead monetize their patent holdings
through litigation by targeting companies that may potentially infringe their
unpracticed patents.60 The asymmetrically high cost of litigation allowed
NPEs “to extract settlements from patent infringement defendants.”61
Industry groups and companies called for patent reform to address the
problem of expensive patent litigation.62
Partially in response to the dissatisfaction with the procedures available,
the AIA was passed in 2011 and was the first major patent reform legislation
passed since 1952.63 In addition to modernizing the patentability standards,64
the AIA also introduced three new procedures for challenging patent validity:
(1) inter partes review (IPR), which replaced inter partes reexamination;65
(2) post-grant review (PGR); and (3) covered business method (CBM)
review.66 The IPR, PGR, and CBM review procedures allow a petitioner to
challenge a patent by raising several grounds of invalidity to the PTAB, after
which the PTAB determines the sufficiency of the grounds raised to
invalidate the patent.67 By introducing these procedures, the AIA sought to
“improve patent quality and restore confidence in the presumption of validity
that comes with issued patents.”68 These procedures were designed to be
more accessible by virtue of having relatively lower fees than the immense
costs of litigation.69 For context, in 2015, the median cost of bringing an IPR
through a PTAB hearing was $275,000, and the cost of bringing an IPR
through appeal was $350,000. In contrast, a low-stakes (i.e., $1 to $10
million at risk) patent infringement litigation cost nearly $2 million through
final disposition.70 For infringement actions with more than $25 million at
risk, the median cost to reach final disposition was $5 million.71 The

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 564.
63. Brufsky, supra note 20. When the AIA was passed, the U.S. patent system was long
overdue for a refresh. For instance, the United States was one of the only countries that still
awarded patents on a “first-to-invent” basis, while the rest of the world had adopted a
“first-to-file” system, which awarded a patent to the applicant who applied for one first.
Richard G. Braun, America Invents Act: First-to-File and a Race to the Patent Office, 8 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 47, 47 (2013).
64. For example, adopting a first-to-file system involved significant changes to what is
considered prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Compare MPEP § 2131 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019,
June 2020), with id. § 2139.
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 311.
66. Ni, supra note 45, at 564–65.
67. AIA Trial Types, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/
ptab/trials/aia-trial-types [https://perma.cc/GZZ7-6A6U] (Sept. 10, 2020, 10:28 AM).
68. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 272 (2016) (citing 157 CONG. REC.
9778 (2011) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte)).
69. Anne S. Layne-Farrar, The Cost of Doubling Up: An Economic Assessment of
Duplication in PTAB Proceedings and Patent Infringement Litigation, AM. BAR ASS’N
(May 1, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/
landslide/2017-18/may-june/cost-doubling-up/ [https://perma.cc/A7RG-YNWX].
70. Id.
71. Id.
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procedures introduced by the AIA were also designed to reach a resolution
much faster due to a statutorily mandated one-year timeline.72
IPRs, PGRs, and CBM reviews differ in the references that can be
considered in the review and their purposes for consideration.73
Chronologically, PGRs occur first—a petition for PGR can be filed
immediately after a patent is granted and up to nine months thereafter.74
Petitioners for PGR can rely on §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 grounds to
disqualify the patent in question.75 On the other hand, IPRs can only be filed
starting from nine months after the patent is granted, after the window for
filing PGRs closes.76 IPRs are also only limited to review on the novelty and
nonobviousness grounds of §§ 102 and 103, based on printed publications.77
CBM review is a procedure that is similar to PGR, but is limited in scope to
patents for financial products or services for which the petitioner was first
sued or charged with infringement.78 This Note will limit its discussion to
the dispute surrounding discretionary institution as it relates to the IPR
practice because it is the most widely used of the three new procedures.
There are additional methods for challenging the validity of a patent
outside of those available at the USPTO. An alleged infringer could
challenge the validity of a patent during the course of litigation.79 Patents
can also be challenged in infringement actions brought before the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) for disputes involving imported
goods.80 While the IPR procedure will be the primary focus of this Note, it
is important to recognize that the IPR procedure does not exist in a vacuum
and can overlap with these additional methods of invalidating patents, most
commonly litigation at the district court level.81

72. One study has observed that the median time from filing to judgment is 658 days
(about 1.8 years). Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 1981 (2016). Of note, an IPR challenge can take up to twenty-four
months if the USPTO spends the entirety of the six months allotted to determine whether the
review should be instituted and grants a six-month extension to reach a final written decision.
Id. at 1999–2000. However, this is the maximum amount of time, not the median.
73. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18,
125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2021) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321 note).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 321.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 311.
77. Id.; see also infra note 95 for a more detailed discussion on printed publications.
78. See Major Differences Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx
[https://perma.cc/E22M-ZBRJ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1337; see also Intellectual Property Developments, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7M6-G4Q2]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
81. Ni, supra note 45, at 567 (“There is a substantial percentage of dual-track litigation at
district courts and at the PTAB. In one study, eighty percent of IPRs involved patents also
asserted in district court litigation. This percentage is especially high when compared to the
thirty-three percent of ex parte reexaminations involving patents also in litigation.”).
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B. Rules Regarding Inter Partes Review
The IPR is a streamlined review conducted at the PTAB that considers the
validity of a granted patent.82 The administrative patent judges (APJs) at the
PTAB act in an adjudicative capacity when reviewing petitions to consider
whether a granted patent is invalid.83 The review is conducted as a
streamlined quasi-trial of sorts, and involves oral arguments and discovery.84
However, unlike judges in a court, APJs are experts in patent law and have
technical expertise as well. For instance, APJs are often patent lawyers and
former patent examiners, or come from other specialized backgrounds.85
Conducting IPRs is an important part of the PTAB’s duties. Since it was
introduced in 2011, the IPR has been the most commonly used procedure out
of those available at the PTAB.86 Over 90 percent of the petitions filed at the
PTAB are petitions for IPR.87 In the 2021 fiscal year (October 1, 2020
through September 30, 2021), 1,308 petitions for IPR were filed.88 By way
of comparison, there were 326 ex parte reexamination filings, ninety-three
petitions for PGR, and zero petitions for CBM review in the same time
period.89 From September 16, 2012 (when the AIA went into effect) through
June 30, 2021, 13,200 total AIA petitions (IPR, PGR, and CBM review) were
filed with the PTAB.90
To initiate an IPR proceeding, a petitioner must file a petition for IPR at
least nine months after the grant or reissue of a patent.91 If the petitioner has

82. Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/
ptab/trials/inter-partes-review [https://perma.cc/2H9J-5P9H] (June 21, 2022, 10:47 AM).
83. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 318.
84. Id. § 316(a)(5), (10).
85. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 268 (2016).
86. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL
AND APPEAL BOARD (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_
statistics_20180930a.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC49-VRXD]; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS: FY19 END OF YEAR OUTCOME ROUNDUP: IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
ptab_aia_fy2019_roundup.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTS6-65S3]; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS: FY20 END OF YEAR OUTCOME ROUNDUP: IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup.pdf [https://perma.cc/926Z-TWJ6]; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS: FY21 END OF YEAR OUTCOME ROUNDUP: IPR, PGR, CBM, PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (2021), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
ptab_aia_fy2021__roundup.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW2Y-EKW4] [hereinafter PTAB Trial
Statistics 2021].
87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. PTAB Trial Statistics 2021, supra note 86.
89. Id.; Reexam Filings Up by 51%, Likely Due to NHK-Fintiv Rule, RPX RATIONAL PAT.
(Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.rpxcorp.com/data-byte/2021-reexam-filings-up-by-51-due-tonhk-fintiv-rule/ [https://perma.cc/NUA7-3ZWC].
90. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PTAB ORANGE BOOK PATENT/
BIOLOGIC PATENT STUDY (2021), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
PTABOBbiologicpatentstudy8.10.2021draftupdatedthruJune2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KH2R-5TML].
91. 35 U.S.C. § 311. If an earlier PTAB review is desired, a petitioner can instead petition
for PGR, which can be filed up to nine months after the patent’s grant. Id. § 321. The timeline
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been served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent, the petition
must be filed within a year of being served.92 In order for the petition to be
granted and for review to be instituted, the petition must identify the real
parties of interest and the challenged claims in the petition, and the petitioner
must pay the requisite fees.93 The petitioner can only challenge a patent
based on novelty and nonobviousness arguments under §§ 102 and 103, and
can only rely on certain types of prior art,94 namely patents and printed
publications.95 The PTAB does not consider invalidity arguments based on
patent eligibility, written description, or enablement under an IPR
proceeding.96 However, if the prior art and arguments raised by the petitioner
are cumulative or redundant as compared to those raised during the
prosecution of the patent, the PTAB can deny the petition.97
Importantly, the petition must also cross a threshold level of probability of
success set by § 314(a) in order for the PTAB to institute the review.98 The
threshold requires that the information presented in the petition supports a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail.99 The reasonable
likelihood standard is essentially a prima facie standard and is interpreted to
mean a 50 percent or greater chance that the petitioner will prevail.100 Once
the IPR is instituted, the PTAB conducts the trial phase of the procedure,
which includes discovery and oral arguments,101 after which the PTAB can
invalidate the patent in a final written decision if the petitioner has

for filing an IPR starts at the point at which the timeline for filing a PGR expires. See Major
Differences Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, supra note 78.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
93. Id. § 312.
94. Id. §§ 311–312.
95. Id. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section
102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”).
The prior art being limited to printed publications means that no evidence of prior public use
or sale of the invention can be considered, even if this evidence would have jeopardized
patentability during examination. This is one major difference between IPR and PGR, which
will consider any grounds of invalidity under §§ 102 and 103. See Major Differences Between
IPR, PGR, and CBM, supra note 78. Prior art outside of printed publications can also be
considered in litigation actions. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3).
96. This is another significant difference between IPR and PGR. See Major Differences
Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, supra note 78.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
98. Id. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section
311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”).
99. Id. Note that, in contrast, the threshold level for instituting the pre-AIA ex parte
reexamination procedure was a substantial new question (SNQ) standard. Id. § 303. SNQ is
considered a lower standard than reasonable likelihood for IPR. Ni, supra note 45, at 566.
100. Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key Aspects of New Administrative Patent Trials, U.S. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. (May 21, 2012, 12:55 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/laws/americainvents-act-aia/message-chief-judge-james-donald-smith-board
[https://perma.cc/GWX5ES33].
101. AIA Trial Types, supra note 67.
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demonstrated invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.102 The PTAB
is also statutorily required to issue a final written decision within twelve
months of the institution, which can be extended by up to six months.103 This
requirement makes IPR proceedings desirable as a time-efficient alternative
to litigation.104 However, as Part II will explore, not all petitioners for IPR
are granted.
C. Administrative Law Principles
The PTAB is an administrative agency and is therefore subject to the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act105 (APA). Similar to how
patent owners face challenges to the validity of their patents, the PTAB’s
actions are vulnerable to challenges claiming that the agency engaged in
improper rulemaking,106 as well as challenges under the landmark case of
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.107
Actions taken by administrative agencies can be challenged on the grounds
that the agency did not engage properly in the rulemaking procedures
required by the APA.108 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit identified four factors in American Mining Congress v.
Mine Safety & Health Administration109 to consider in this analysis:
(1) whether, absent the legislative rule by the agency, the basis for
enforcement would be inadequate;110 (2) whether the rule was published in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR);111 (3) whether the agency explicitly
invoked its legislative authority;112 and (4) whether the agency action
amended a prior rule.113 Courts have given the fourth factor particular
emphasis in this analysis.114 If any one of the four factors is met, then the
agency has issued a new legislative rule, not an interpretive rule, and must
therefore go through the proper rulemaking procedures.115 Such procedure
requires that the agency publish a notice of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register, give interested parties the chance to respond, consider the
comments received, and publish the final rule with a concise general
statement of the basis and purpose of the rule.116

102. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). In contrast, an invalidity challenge before a district court must
meet the higher “clear and convincing” standard. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S.
91, 95 (2011).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
104. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
105. 5 U.S.C §§ 551–559.
106. Id. § 706(2)(D).
107. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)).
108. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
109. 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 1109, 1112.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1109–10, 1112.
113. Id. at 1112.
114. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1088–91 (9th Cir. 2003).
115. Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3), (c).
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Agency actions can also be challenged for exceeding the agency’s
statutory authority under the Chevron analysis. First, the court must consider
whether the agency action is subject to Chevron based on the factors laid out
in United States v. Mead Corp.117: (1) whether Congress delegated authority
to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law118 and (2) whether the
agency action was promulgated with the force of law in exercise of that
authority.119 If the agency action is not subject to the Chevron analysis, the
court applies the analysis from Skidmore v. Swift & Co.120 analysis instead,
whereby the court defers to the action if it finds the agency’s interpretation
persuasive based on the thoroughness of its investigation, the validity of its
reasoning, the consistency of its interpretation over time, and other
persuasive factors.121
If Congress granted the agency rulemaking power and the agency’s action
is within the scope of its authority, then the Court engages in the two-step
Chevron analysis.122 The first step considers whether Congress spoke
directly to the precise issues that the agency regulated; if so, the agency must
follow what is required by the statute.123 On the other hand, if Congress left
ambiguity in the organic statute to be interpreted by the agency,124 the
analysis proceeds to step two.125 In the second step, the Court considers
whether the agency’s interpretation was within the permissible parameters of
the statute.126 If not, the agency’s action is invalid.127
II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INSTITUTION OF IPR
The PTAB introduced its practice of discretionary denial based on the
NHK-Fintiv factors in two precedential opinions at the PTAB. The basis for
these opinions lies in PTAB and Supreme Court precedent. Part II.A
considers the precedential rulings that serve as the basis for the PTAB’s
discretionary-denial practice. Part II.B discusses how federal courts have
treated challenges to PTAB procedures. Part II.C discusses current pending
proposals for reform.
A. The Standard for Discretionary Denial
The PTAB has interpreted § 314(a) as granting the PTAB unfettered
discretion in deciding whether to institute review, even if the petition meets

117. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
118. Id. at 229.
119. Id.
120. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
121. Id. at 140.
122. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
123. Id.
124. Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “organic statute” as “[a]
law that establishes an administrative agency or local government.”).
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
126. Id. at 843–44.
127. Id.
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all other statutory requirements.128 When the AIA was passed, Congress
gave the PTAB the power to deny institution under § 314(a) based on the
reasonable likelihood standard, as well as the power to deny petitions raising
redundant arguments or prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). However, since
the IPR was introduced, the PTAB has determined that various circumstances
allow for discretionary denial based on its authority under § 314(a).129
Several PTAB decisions that have been designated as precedential
implement this discretionary denial.130 According to the standard operating
procedures of the PTAB, decisions are not binding in later cases by
default.131 However, if the USPTO director designates a case as
precedential, this makes the decision binding on future APJs.132 These
precedential decisions regarding discretionary denial have thus been
followed by the PTAB since their designation.133
1. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
The PTAB’s discretionary-denial procedure was preceded by two
important Supreme Court decisions that set the basis for the procedure. The
first decision was Cuozzo Speed Tech, LLC v. Lee.134 In Cuozzo, the
appellant challenged the PTAB’s decision to review two claims that were
eventually invalidated by the PTAB in an IPR procedure.135 The Court held
that the PTAB’s decision to institute review on these claims could not be
questioned by the Court, and that the decision to review was “a matter
committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”136 At this time, the PTAB had
not contemplated discretionary denials of review.137 However, the Court’s
indication that certain decisions were left to PTAB discretion was used as the
basis for discretionary denial under § 314(a).138
128. See infra Part II.A.2.
129. Joel D. Sayres & Reid E. Dodge, Unfettered Discretion: A Closer Look at the Board’s
Discretion to Deny Institution, 19 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 536, 540 (2020).
130. Precedential and Informative Decisions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/precedential-informative-decisions
[https://perma.cc/
7GHN-KT3F] (Aug. 6, 2018).
131. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 10),
at 2–3, 11 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%
20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DSD-LCVV].
132. Precedential and Informative Decisions, supra note 130 (“A precedential decision
establishes binding authority concerning major policy or procedural issues, or other issues of
exceptional importance, including constitutional questions, important issues regarding
statutes, rules, and regulations, important issues regarding case law, or issues of broad
applicability to the Board.”); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 131, at 1.
133. See infra Part II.A.3.
134. 579 U.S. 261 (2016).
135. Id. at 270.
136. Id. at 273.
137. Cuozzo was decided in 2016, while NHK and Fintiv were decided in 2018 and 2020,
respectively.
138. See, e.g., Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357,
at 19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (citing Cuozzo Speed Tech, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 272–73
(2016), as authority for the principle that “institution of review is committed to the Director’s
discretion”).
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The second important Supreme Court decision was SAS Institute Inc. v.
Iancu.139 In SAS, the Court struck down the PTAB’s partial institution
practice at the time, which allowed the PTAB to review only a subset of the
claims raised in an IPR petition.140 Following the Court’s decision in SAS,
the PTAB must either deny a petition in whole or institute review on all
grounds raised by a petitioner.141 Due to concerns of an increased burden on
the PTAB imposed by this decision, the USPTO followed up with guidance
indicating that it would deny § 314(a) petitions asserting that the challenged
patent had voluminous or excessive grounds, a low percentage of asserted
claims or grounds that meet the reasonable likelihood threshold, or indefinite
claims.142
Cuozzo and SAS were both significant decisions and were precursors to the
PTAB’s discretionary-denial practice.143 Cuozzo was important because the
PTAB interpreted the Court’s dicta about the board’s discretion as allowing
the current regime of discretionary denials of institution under § 314(a).144
Meanwhile, SAS was significant for its impact on the way that IPR
procedures are conducted at the PTAB.145 The PTAB feared that SAS would
significantly amplify its IPR burden and, looking for other ways to reduce
that burden, interpreted § 314 to allow discretionary denials of institution of
IPR.146
2. Introduction of Discretionary Denial in General Plastic
The first precedential PTAB decision regarding discretionary denial is
General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha.147 The General
Plastic decision set the basis for the PTAB’s interpretation of the text of
§ 314(a) as permissive, allowing the USPTO director to exercise discretion
based on nonstatutory criteria in deciding whether to institute an IPR.148 The
PTAB in General Plastic focused specifically on the phrase “may not
authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless [the § 314(a) threshold
is met].”149
In General Plastic, the petitioner had filed a first petition for IPR that was
unsuccessful, and then filed a second petition, hoping for a more favorable
139. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
140. Id. at 1359–60.
141. Id.; see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., SAS Q&AS (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sas_qas_20180605.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FM7Q-Z6P7]. Shortly after the SAS decision, the USPTO issued its own
guidance, confirming that the board would thereafter “institute on all challenges raised in the
petition or not institute at all (i.e., it will be a binary decision).” Id.
142. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 141; Sayres, supra note 129, at 543; see
also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108.
143. See, e.g., Sayres, supra note 129, at 541–44.
144. Id. at 541.
145. Id. at 541–42.
146. Id.
147. No. IPR2016-01357 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017).
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).
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result.150 The discretionary denial of IPR was based on the fact that the
petitioner had attempted several follow-up petitions after a first wave of
petitions was denied.151 As justification for its exercise of discretion, the
PTAB cited “the goals of the AIA—namely, to improve patent quality and
make the patent system more efficient by the use of post-grant review
procedures,”152 and noted that there was a “potential for abuse of the review
process by repeated attacks on patents.”153 In particular, the PTAB was
concerned that staggered petitions could be abused by enabling petitioners to
strategically stage their arguments, using the PTAB’s decisions as a roadmap,
until a ground is found that results in a grant of review.154
Thus, the PTAB held that § 314(a) allowed discretionary denials to prevent
abuse of the IPR system and to deny institution of review if the petitioner had
filed multiple successive petitions on the same patent, and no other factors
weighed in favor of institution of review.155
3. Expansion of Discretionary Denial Under NHK and Fintiv
Although General Plastic involved a petitioner attempting to file multiple
petitions in succession at the PTAB, it laid the groundwork for the PTAB’s
current policy of discretionary denial in the context of parallel litigation
proceedings outside of the PTAB.156 The two most important precedential
opinions on this type of discretion are NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex
Technologies, Inc.157 and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.158
In NHK, the PTAB denied institution under both §§ 325(d) and 314(a).159
With regards to § 325(d), the PTAB found that the petitioner relied on much
of the same prior art that was considered during the examination of the
application, and that the petitioner’s arguments were substantially the
same.160 Rather than concluding the decision with the § 325(d) analysis,
however, the PTAB also set criteria for how the PTAB should consider
discretionary denial of institution under § 314(a).161 Relying on its precedent
in General Plastic, the PTAB argued that this dual analysis was appropriate
since there was “no ‘intent to limit discretion under § 314(a), such that it
is . . . encompassed by § 325(d).’”162
First, the PTAB noted that a lapse in time between the grant of the patent
and the filing of the petition should not weigh in favor of denying review,
150. Id. at 2–3.
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 17.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 17–18.
156. See supra Part II.A.2.
157. No. IPR2018-00752 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018).
158. No. IPR2020-00019 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020).
159. NHK, No. IPR2018-00752, at 11.
160. Id. at 11–12.
161. Id. at 18.
162. Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki
Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, at 18–19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017)).
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and it distinguished the case from General Plastic, since the petitioner in this
case did not gain any tactical advantage by waiting to file the petition.163
Nevertheless, the PTAB held that the IPR should not be instituted based on
the advanced state of the parallel district court proceeding, which was slated
to finish before the PTAB was to reach a final decision.164 The PTAB cited
inefficiency and duplicative efforts as reasons for denying institution since
the asserted prior art was the same in both proceedings.165
The NHK decision set the precedent that the PTAB could consider the state
of any parallel court proceedings in determining whether to institute
review.166 NHK also held that the discretion in § 314(a) recognized in
General Plastic was not limited by the explicit discretion given to the PTAB
in § 325(d).167
The PTAB elaborated on the discretion identified in NHK in the case of
Fintiv, where it identified six nonexclusive factors that the PTAB could
consider in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 314(a).168
The PTAB explained that these six factors “relate to whether efficiency,
fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution
in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.”169 Secondarily,
the PTAB also relied on 35 U.S.C. § 316, which allows the director to
“consider the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of
the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability
of the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under th[e]
chapter.”170
The first factor identified in Fintiv is “whether the Court granted a stay or
evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted.”171 The
PTAB cited concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts as
justification for discretionary denial of institution.172 In some instances, even
if no stay is issued, the district court may indicate that it will consider a
renewed motion or reconsider a motion for a stay if a PTAB trial is
instituted.173 According to the PTAB, this could signal that the district court
is willing to avoid duplicative efforts and await the PTAB’s final
resolution.174 However, the proximity of the court’s trial date and amount of
time invested by the court are also relevant to how much weight to give the
court’s willingness to reconsider a stay.175 The PTAB also noted that it is
common for stays to be granted when there are parallel district court and ITC
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, at 6 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 316(b); Fintiv, No. IPR2020-00019, at 6.
Fintiv, No. IPR2020-00019, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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investigations involving a challenged patent.176 In these cases, although the
PTAB and the district court are not bound by the ITC, the PTAB may
consider an early ITC trial date as favoring the exercise of discretion to deny
institution.177
The second factor is the “proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s
projected statutory deadline for a final written decision.”178 The PTAB noted
that if the court’s trial date is earlier than their projected decision deadline,
this generally weighs in favor of exercising discretionary denial of
institution.179 On the other hand, if the trial date is at or around the same
time as the projected statutory deadline, or is significantly after the statutory
deadline, then the decision whether to institute review will depend on the
other factors.180
Factor three looks at “investment in the parallel proceeding by the court
and the parties.”181 For this factor, the PTAB considers the amount and type
of work already completed in the parallel proceeding by the court and by the
parties at the time of the decision.182 If the district court has issued
substantive orders related to the patent (such as claim construction orders),
this weighs in favor of denial.183 The PTAB notes that, like with the trial
date factor, the more work completed by the parties and the court in the
parallel proceeding, the less likely a stay will be issued and the greater the
risk that instituting review would lead to duplicative costs.184 Timing of the
parties’ action can also be relevant here—for instance, if the evidence shows
that petitioner filed the petition expeditiously, this can weigh against denying
institution.185 If, on the other hand, the evidence shows that petitioner
delayed without a good explanation, this can weigh in favor of denial.186
The fourth factor considers any “overlap between issues raised in the
petition and in the parallel proceeding.”187 For this factor, the PTAB stated
that if the petition includes “the same or substantially the same claims,
grounds, arguments, and evidence as presented in the parallel proceeding,”
this favors denial of review.188 On the other hand, if the petition includes
materially different arguments, this can weigh against denial.189 Still, the
PTAB noted that assessing this overlap can be a highly fact-dependent

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.

2022] DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INTER PARTES REVIEW

627

analysis and depends on the similarity of the claims challenged in the petition
to those at issue in the district court.190
The fifth factor considers “whether the petitioner and the defendant in the
parallel proceeding are the same party.”191 The PTAB has weighed this
factor in favor of institution if the petitioner in the proceeding is unrelated to
the defendant in an earlier or parallel court proceeding.192 However, the
PTAB may still exercise discretion to deny institution if the issues are the
same or substantially similar to those that are already or about to be
litigated.193
Lastly, factor six simply looks at “other circumstances that impact the
Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits.”194 For instance, the
PTAB states that if the merits of a petition seem “particularly strong,”195 this
factor weighs in favor of institution since the IPR may serve the interest of
the overall efficiency and integrity of the system by allowing the PTAB to
resolve the patentability question in case the parallel proceeding does not.196
Conversely, if the merits of the petition is a “closer call,” then the PTAB can
deny institution when the other factors weigh in favor of denial.197 However,
the PTAB clarified that factor six does not require a “full merits analysis”;198
instead, the PTAB should consider the strengths and weaknesses of a petition
as part of its balanced assessment.199
The PTAB also clarified that there is some overlap among the factors, and
that certain factors may be more relevant than others.200 Thus, the PTAB
noted that it takes a holistic view of whether “efficiency and integrity of the
system are best served by denying or instituting review.”201
4. Application of the NHK-Fintiv Factors in Recent PTAB Decisions
Following the designation of NHK and Fintiv as precedential opinions, the
PTAB has applied each of the six Fintiv factors and considered the balance
of all of the factors in determining whether to exercise discretion and deny
institution.202 Several of these decisions have also been designated
precedential or informative.203 These decisions fall under two main
categories: (1) decisions in which the petitioner’s stipulation at the district
190. Id. at 13.
191. Id. at 6.
192. Id. at 13–14.
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Id. at 14.
196. Id. at 14–15.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 15–16.
200. Id. at 6.
201. Id.
202. A precedential decision establishes binding authority on the PTAB, whereas an
informative decision provides PTAB with norms and guidance on recurring issues.
Precedential and Informative Decisions, supra note 130.
203. Id.
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court weighed against discretionary denial of institution and (2) decisions in
which the balance of the six factors or the power to deny petitions raising
redundant arguments or prior art under § 325(d) weighed against
discretionary denial of institution.
a. Stipulation at the District Court
In Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group-Trucking
LLC,204 the PTAB held that a § 314(a) analysis weighed against discretionary
denial after conducting a holistic analysis of the six factors identified in
Fintiv.205 The PTAB noted that it was unclear whether there would be a
stay,206 that the trial date was difficult to predict,207 and that there had not
been much investment in the district court proceedings yet.208 Importantly,
the PTAB considered that the petitioner had stipulated that if an IPR were
instituted, they would not pursue the same grounds in the district court
litigation, which mitigated to some degree concerns of duplicative efforts at
the PTAB.209 The PTAB held that this stipulation weighed “marginally” in
favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution under § 314(a).210
The PTAB also considered the importance of a petitioner’s similar
stipulation in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo.211 Here, the PTAB again
decided against discretionary denial of institution under § 314(a) and
considered factor four of Fintiv to be the most compelling factor.212 The
petitioner in Sotera Wireless stipulated that they would not pursue in district
court anything that was, or could have been, raised during the IPR, which
again mitigated any concerns of duplicative efforts.213 Because of the
petitioner’s stipulation, the PTAB decided against exercising its discretion to
deny institution.214
b. Overlap with 35 U.S.C. § 325
In Snap, Inc. v. SRK Technology LLC,215 the PTAB decided that the six
Fintiv factors weighed against discretionary denial.216 Factors one, two, and
three all weighed strongly against discretionary denial in this case.217 As to
factor one, the district court proceeding was stayed.218 For factor two, there
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

No. IPR2019-01393 (P.T.A.B. June 16, 2020).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8–10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 10.
No. IPR2020-01019 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020).
Id. at 18–21.
Id. at 18–19.
Id.
No. IPR2020-00820 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2020).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8–13.
Id. at 9.

2022] DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INTER PARTES REVIEW

629

was no set trial date, and the PTAB could only speculate as to when it would
occur.219 For factor three, the district court was in the early stages of
litigation, which alleviated the PTAB’s concerns of duplicating efforts.220
Thus, the PTAB held that the Fintiv factors weighed against discretionary
denial of institution under § 314(a).221 At the same time, the PTAB also
declined to exercise discretion under § 325(d).222
Next, in Oticon Medical AB v. Cochlear Ltd.,223 the PTAB again decided
against discretionary denial of institution under § 314(a).224 In this case, the
PTAB highlighted that the petition was timely filed, that there was no
evidence that the petitioner attempted to stall district court proceedings, and
that no trial date was set, nor was there any evidence that the PTAB
proceeding would overlap with the district court proceeding.225 Thus, the
PTAB held that the factors weighed against discretionary denial of
institution.226 Like in Snap, Inc., the PTAB held that § 325(d) weighed
against discretionary denial of institution as well.227
As the Snap, Inc. and Oticon Medical opinions show, the PTAB’s decision
not to exercise discretion in instituting IPR under § 314(a) overlap with the
PTAB’s similar decisions not to deny review under § 325(d).
B. The Courts’ Review of Discretionary Denial
Patent owners have attempted to challenge the practice of discretionary
denial at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but with limited
success. The Federal Circuit is the only court, other than the Supreme Court,
in which patent owners can attempt such a challenge, as it has exclusive
jurisdiction over PTAB appeals.228
The Supreme Court first considered the reviewability of the PTAB’s
decision to institute review in Cuozzo, albeit not within the context of
§ 314.229 The patent owner, Cuozzo, had three of its claims canceled during
an IPR brought by Garmin.230 Cuozzo challenged the decision at the Federal
Circuit, then at the Supreme Court, and argued that the PTAB did not
properly follow the “with particularity” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312, and
that the PTAB’s use of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard
during claim construction was improper.231 The Supreme Court held that the
claim construction standard set by the USPTO was a proper use of its

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 19.
Id.
No. IPR2019-00975 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2019).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 20.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261 (2016).
Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 270–71.
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authority under Chevron.232 Furthermore, the Court held that it did not have
the authority to review the PTAB’s decision to institute review on two of the
three canceled claims.233 In doing so, the Court reasoned that § 314(d) makes
the decision whether to institute review “final and non-appealable” because
“the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent
Office’s discretion.”234 Cuozzo first recognized that the PTAB has “no
mandate to institute review” under § 314(a).235 The Court noted that there
was a “‘strong presumption’ in favor of judicial review”236 when interpreting
statutes, but such a presumption “may be overcome by ‘clear and convincing’
indications, drawn from ‘specific language,’ ‘specific legislative history,’
and “inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a
whole’ . . . .”237 The Cuozzo Court was nevertheless careful to clarify that it
does not “categorically preclude review of a final decision”238 by the PTAB
to institute or deny review; rather, the Court emphasized that it would not
review cases where “the grounds for attacking the decision to institute inter
partes review consists of questions that are closely tied to the application and
interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter
partes review.”239
Relatedly, in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP,240 the Supreme
Court held that the director’s application of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar241
was “final and nonappealable” under § 314(d).242 In Thryv, the PTAB
instituted review on a petition despite Click-to-Call’s argument that the
petition was not timely filed within the one-year statutory period under
§ 315(b).243 Click-to-Call appealed, and the Federal Circuit held that
§ 314(d) bars appeal of institution decisions.244 However, in a separate case,
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,245 the Federal Circuit held that time-bar
determinations were appealable.246 In light of the Wi-Fi One decision, the
Federal Circuit reheard Click-to-Call’s claims, treated the § 315(b) issue as
reviewable, held that the petition was untimely, vacated the PTAB’s
decision, and remanded the petition to be dismissed.247 The Supreme Court
thus granted certiorari and held that the PTAB’s application of the § 315(b)
time bar was not subject to judicial review.248 The Court noted that the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 266, 280.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015)).
Id. (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1984)).
Id. at 275.
Id. at 274–75.
140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020).
35 U.S.C. § 315(b); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1376.
Id. at 1370–71.
Id. at 1372.
878 F.3d 1364, 1367 (2018).
Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1372.
Id.
Id.
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PTAB’s refusal to institute review was supported by § 314(d) and the Court’s
holding in Cuozzo.249 The Court elaborated that a timeliness challenge based
on § 315(b) counts as an appeal of the agency’s decision to institute an IPR
because it is tied to the application and interpretation of the statutes related
to institution.250 The Court noted that § 315 expressly governs institution
and nothing more, thus the PTAB’s decision whether to apply it is not
reviewable by the Court.251
In In re Cisco Systems Inc.,252 the Federal Circuit followed Cuozzo by
holding that it did not have the authority to review the PTAB’s application
of the NHK-Fintiv factors.253 The Federal Circuit in Cisco held that such
review was prohibited under § 314(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295.254 According
to Cisco, the Federal Circuit’s authority to review PTAB decisions under
§ 1295 was outweighed by language in § 314(d) stating that decisions to
institute are nonappealable.255 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit relied on the
Court’s statement in Cuozzo that § 314(d) barred review of matters “closely
tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent
Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review.”256 The Federal Circuit held
that the decision to institute and the application of the NHK-Fintiv factors in
Cisco was such a matter, since the PTAB’s consideration of these factors
“rank[s] as [a] question[] closely tied to the application and interpretation of
statutes relating to the Patent Office’s decision whether to institute
review.”257
Following Cisco, several parties have attempted to challenge applications
of the NHK-Fintiv factors in federal court without success.258 The most
recent instance of this arose in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, in a case where the court held that Cuozzo and Thryv
required that § 314(d) barred the court’s review of the PTAB’s application of
the NHK-Fintiv factors.259

249. Id. at 1373.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 834 Fed. App’x 571 (2020).
253. Id. at 573.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Mylan Labs Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (holding that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over Mylan’s appeal of the PTAB’s
decision to deny institution); Notice of Docketing, Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., No. 20-2132
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2020), ECF No. 1-1 (appealing the PTAB’s decision to deny institution);
Notice of Docketing, Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., No. 20-2211 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2020), ECF
No. 1-1 (same); Notice of Docketing, Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., No. 20-2213 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
28, 2020), ECF No. 1-1 (same); Notice of Docketing, Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., No. 20-1033
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2020), ECF No. 1-1 (same).
259. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss; Terminating Motion for Summary Judgment at 1,
Apple Inc. v. Iancu, No. 20-cv-06128 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2021), ECF No. 133.
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Parties have attempted to appeal the practice of discretionary denial to the
Supreme Court due to the lack of success in lower federal courts. Thus far,
these petitions for certiorari have been unsuccessful.260
C. Current Proposals for Reform
This section will discuss the current proposals at the USPTO and Congress
to address the controversy surrounding the PTAB’s discretionary-denial
practice through new rules or legislation. These potential changes are still at
their early stages and have not yet been formally adopted. Part II.C.1 will
summarize the proposed rulemaking at the USPTO. Part II.C.2 will discuss
the proposed legislation in Congress.
1. Proposed Rulemaking at the USPTO
In response to the controversy that the NHK-Fintiv rulings have brought to
the patent community, the USPTO requested comments on the PTAB’s
discretionary-denial practice in a Federal Register notice issued October 20,
2020.261 The request noted that the USPTO had already received suggestions
on how to proceed with discretionary denial, but it asked for further input
from stakeholders.262 According to the USPTO, the most common type of
input it received was that the case-specific analysis outlined in General
Plastic, NHK, and Fintiv “achieves the appropriate balance and reduces
gamesmanship.”263 The USPTO also acknowledged that other stakeholders
have asked for the adoption of a bright-line rule under which discretion is
exercised to preclude claims from being subject to more than one AIA
proceeding, regardless of the circumstances.264 Another proposal received
was that the USPTO should only permit more than one AIA proceeding if
the follow-on petitioner is unrelated to the prior petitioner.265
The USPTO’s request drew a significant response from stakeholders,
resulting in over 800 comments.266 Comments were received across the
board from various interested parties, including individual inventors and
patent holders, small companies, large companies, and even from former
examiners.267 Smaller entities were generally concerned about the lack of
predictability in the PTAB’s current procedures in approving or denying

260. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Optis Cellular Tech., LLC, 142 S. Ct. 859 (2022) (mem.)
(denying petition for certiorari); Intel Co. v. VLSI Tech. LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1363 (2022) (mem.)
(same).
261. Request for Comments on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, 85 Fed. Reg. 66502 (Oct. 20, 2020).
262. Id. at 66505–06.
263. Id. at 66505.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/document/PTO-C-2020-00550001/comment [https://perma.cc/4CYH-CPJZ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
267. Id.
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institution following the NHK and Fintiv precedents.268 These smaller
entities were also concerned about the weaponization of IPRs against small
tech start-ups by bigger competitors.269 A few individual inventors provided
anecdotes of how they invested in research and development on an invention,
received a patent, relied on that patent for their livelihood, and then lost that
patent several years later in a PTAB proceeding.270 Larger entities were also
concerned about the way in which the PTAB conducts IPRs.271 In a letter
signed by fifty-four companies, including Amazon, Ford, General Motors,
Google, Intel, Microsoft, and Samsung, larger entities argued that invalid
patents should not be shielded from cancellation, and that discretionary
denial allows invalid patents to remain in force until they are litigated at a
significantly greater cost.272 Some comments from large entities pointed out
that there were already concerns about the slowness of litigation, and these
delays have only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.273 The
larger entities also noted the danger of a rise in non-practicing entities or
patent trolls.274 Although the various entities that responded to the USPTO’s
request have different concerns, the sheer number of responses received
shows that the way in which the PTAB conducts IPR is consequential to
essentially all patent holders, regardless of economic strength or entity
size.275
The USPTO has not yet adopted any rules codifying or changing the
application of the NHK-Fintiv factors. However, USPTO director Kathi
Vidal has issued a memorandum providing interim guidance on
discretionary-denial practice.276 The memorandum generally confirms the
268. See, e.g., Michael Schulze, Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTOC-2020-0055-0015 [https://perma.cc/9R5V-SFVB]; Dr. Steven LeBoeuf, Comment on
Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTO-C-2020-0055-0011
[https://perma.cc/32ZWCH7B]; Tom Pierson, Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTO-C-2020-00550013 [https://perma.cc/4SHB-C9R5]; Brad Morse, Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/
comment/PTO-C-2020-0055-0017 [https://perma.cc/LU9B-RDX6].
269. See, e.g., Andrew Sherman, Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTOC-2020-0055-0012 [https://perma.cc/79NA-CWB3]; LeBoeuf, supra note 268.
270. See, e.g., Pierson, supra note 268; Zip-it, Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/
comment/PTO-C-2020-0055-0026 [https://perma.cc/4SHB-C9R5].
271. Enplug Inc., Comment on Discretion to Institute Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTO-C-2020-00550010 [https://perma.cc/7TK8-L96Q].
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Dani Kass, Sens. Back PTAB Denial Rules, Drug Pricing Activists Balk, LAW360
(Dec. 4, 2020, 10:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1320928/sens-back-ptab-denialrules-drug-pricing-activists-balk [https://perma.cc/Y8FC-GSGJ].
276. Memorandum from Katherine K. Vidal, Dir., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., to U.S. Pat.
Trial & Appeal Bd. (June 21, 2022), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
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current PTAB discretionary-denial practice as discussed in detail in Part II.A.
For instance, the memorandum noted that “compelling, meritorious
challenges will be allowed to proceed at the PTAB even where district court
litigation is proceeding in parallel,” although the PTAB would still retain
discretion to deny challenges if there is evidence of abuse of the system.277
It also confirmed that the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution when
the petitioner stipulates not to pursue, in a parallel proceeding, any grounds
that were raised or could have been raised before the PTAB, according to
Sotera Wireless.278
In addition to confirming the current discretionary-denial practice, the
memorandum also clarified certain points that had not been previously
addressed by PTAB precedent. For instance, the memorandum noted that the
Fintiv factors would not apply to parallel ITC proceedings because the ITC
lacks authority to invalidate a patent, and its invalidity rulings are not binding
on the USPTO, unlike those issued by district courts.279 Additionally, the
memorandum stated that proximity to trial should not “outweigh all of [the]
other [Fintiv] factors,” since stakeholders have “correctly” pointed out that
the scheduled trial dates are often unreliable.280 Although the interim
guidance has helped to clarify certain parts of discretionary-denial procedure,
the USPTO noted that they still plan to “soon explore potential
rulemaking.”281
2. Proposed Legislation by Congress
The PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial has also garnered the
attention of lawmakers in Congress. During an event celebrating the tenth
anniversary of the AIA, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a chief sponsor of the AIA,
proposed a bill to reform the PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial of
institution of review.282 This first proposal was known as the Restoring the
America Invents Act,283 which would have amended § 314(a) by striking the
language, “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be
instituted unless” and replacing it with “Subject only to the discretion of the
Director under section 325(d)(4), a petition that meets the requirements of
this chapter shall be instituted if.”284 This change would have effectively
eradicated the PTAB’s basis for discretionary denial and allowed denial
interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621
_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLF5-947K].
277. Id. at 4.
278. Id. at 3; see also supra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
279. Memorandum from Katherine K. Vidal to U.S. Pat. Trial & Appeal Bd., supra note
276, at 6–7.
280. Id. at 8.
281. Id. at 2.
282. Kass, supra note 18.
283. S. 2891, 117th Cong. (2021); Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Sen., Leahy and Cornyn
Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Support American Innovation and Reduce Litigation (Sept.
29, 2021), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-and-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-bill-tosupport-american-innovation-and-reduce-litigation [https://perma.cc/2JUQ-6BQ4].
284. S. 2891 § 2.
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based on the discretion granted under § 325(d) only if a petition included
redundant or overlapping arguments or prior art as compared to those raised
during examination.285
However, the bill has been opposed by Senators Thom Tillis and Chris
Coons, both of whom are also members of the Senate Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property that Senator Leahy heads as of the time of writing.286
Senators Tillis and Coons support limiting the PTAB’s ability to invalidate a
patent and believe that Senator Leahy’s proposed bill removing the PTAB’s
ability for discretionary denial would give the PTAB too much power.287
Thus, Senators Leahy, Tillis, and John Cornyn came together and proposed
a second bill, known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Reform Act of
2022.288 According to the senators’ description of the bill, the proposal
would allow the director to rehear PTAB decisions, but such decisions would
have to be issued in a separate opinion, and the director would be prohibited
from participating in predecisional PTAB proceedings.289 The bill would
also require the director to enact regulations sanctioning bad-faith
challengers and impose deadlines on rehearing decisions to ensure the
expeditiousness of the process; the bill further clarifies that a voluntarily
dismissed suit will not bar the sued party from petitioning based on that
earlier suit.290 Lastly, the bill clarifies that any party that expects to be
estopped as a result of a PTAB decision can appeal, and covers reasonable
fees for answering a PTAB challenge for small and micro entities.291
At the time of this Note’s publication, neither proposed bill has been
adopted.292
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NHK-FINTIV FACTORS
AND CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
Given the uncertainty of the actions pending at the Supreme Court and the
bills pending in Congress, there are several different ways the future of the
NHK-Fintiv factors can play out. Part III.A considers the legality of the
285. Id.
286. Dani Kass, Leahy’s Exit May Return Senate IP Control to PTAB Critics, LAW360
(Nov. 15, 2021, 9:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1440499 [https://perma.cc/
29KA-2PS5].
287. Id.
288. S. 4417, 117th Cong. (2022); Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Sen., Leahy, Cornyn, and
Tillis Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Ensure the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Is a Fair and
Predictable Forum for All Parties (June 16, 2022), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahycornyn-and-tillis-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-ensure-the-patent-trial-and-appeal-board-is-afair-and-predictable-forum-for-all-parties [https://perma.cc/H57V-S6EY].
289. THE PTAB REFORM ACT OF 2022, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
PTAB%20Reform%20Act%20One%20Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G89-4VT7].
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Senator Leahy has announced that he will be retiring and will not run for reelection in
2022. Dani Kass, Sen. Leahy Announces End to Congressional Career, LAW360 (Nov. 15,
2021, 10:23 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1440344 [https://perma.cc/LJ8QPLW8]. The future of the bill is unclear, given the differing opinions in Congress on how best
to reform the PTAB. Id.
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PTAB’s actions and their judicial reviewability should the Supreme Court
decide to grant certiorari on a related case. Part III.B proposes legislative
reform to improve the IPR procedure.
A. Legal Validity of the NHK-Fintiv Factors
As discussed in Part II.B, parties have so far been unsuccessful in
challenging the PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial in the courts.
However, with petitions for certiorari pending at the Supreme Court,293 the
Court should grant the petitions and hold that the PTAB’s practice is invalid
under the APA. Part III.A.1 will address the judicial reviewability of the
discretionary-denial practice. Part III.A.2 will discuss the validity of the
PTAB’s practice under administrative law.
1. Reviewability of the PTAB’s Actions by the Supreme Court
For the Supreme Court to decide whether the NHK-Fintiv factors are
proper under the APA, it will first need to decide the threshold issue of
whether the PTAB’s application of these factors is even judicially
reviewable.294 As previously discussed, § 314(d) prohibits judicial review
of the PTAB’s decision to institute review.295 On the other hand, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 gives the court authority to review decisions related to IPR.296
There are three Supreme Court decisions that have dealt with resolving the
tension between § 314(d) and § 1295: Cuozzo,297 SAS,298 and Thryv.299 As
noted above, the Court held that the issues raised with regard to IPR
procedure in Cuozzo and Thryv were not reviewable.300 On the other hand,
the Court did review the IPR procedure–related issue raised in SAS.301 Based
on the body of case law in this area, the PTAB’s actions should be reviewable
by the Court despite the language in § 314(d). The challenge to the
NHK-Fintiv factors is more similar to SAS than it is to Cuozzo or Thryv.
In Cuozzo, the appellant challenged the PTAB’s decision to review
specific claims in one particular petition for IPR. 302 In Thryv, the appellant
similarly challenged the PTAB’s decision to institute review of a specific
petition.303 The Court in Cuozzo was concerned about judicial review
293. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., In re Cisco Sys. Inc., 834 Fed. App’x 571, 573 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We lack
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) to hear Cisco’s appeals.”).
295. “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under
this section shall be final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d); see also supra Part.II.B.
296. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to . . . inter partes review.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(A).
297. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261 (2016).
298. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
299. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020).
300. See supra Part II.B.
301. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
302. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 270–71.
303. Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1367.
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eroding the PTAB’s power to conduct IPRs as Congress intended.304 In both
Thryv and Cuozzo, the appellants did not ask to overturn an established PTAB
policy; rather, the appellants disagreed with the PTAB’s particular
application of that policy.305 The Court in Cuozzo also specifically
emphasized that the strong presumption of judicial review “may be overcome
by ‘clear and convincing’ indications, drawn from ‘specific language,’
‘specific legislative history,’ and ‘inferences of intent drawn from the
statutory scheme as a whole’ . . . .”306 The Court in Cuozzo specifically
clarified that its decision not to review applies “where the grounds for
attacking the decision to institute inter partes review consist of questions that
are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the
Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review.”307
On the other hand, in SAS, the issue raised by the appellant was whether
the PTAB’s policy of instituting review on some claims but not others was a
valid practice based on the statute.308 The Supreme Court held that the PTAB
had to institute review based on all claims or none; it could not partially
institute review.309
An appellant challenging the NHK-Fintiv factors would be doing so as a
challenge of a general PTAB policy, just as was raised in the SAS case.310
Although the appellant would be challenging the PTAB’s decision to institute
review in a particular case, that challenge would rely on the argument that
the PTAB’s practice of applying the NHK-Fintiv factors is unlawful in
general.311 This distinguishes the circumstances of the Court’s review of the
NHK-Fintiv factors from the circumstances in Cuozzo or Thryv.
The Court in Cuozzo did note that whether judicial review was allowed
depended on the extent to which the issue is “closely tied to the application
and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate
inter partes review.”312 Still, the issue raised in SAS also depended on the
PTAB’s interpretation of the IPR statute (§ 318), but the Court reviewed the
PTAB’s actions nonetheless and held that its interpretation of the statute was
incorrect.313 Similarly, in a case challenging application of the NHK-Fintiv
factors, the Court could determine that the PTAB’s interpretation of § 314(a)
was correct or incorrect, thereby upholding or striking down its practice of
discretionary denial of institution.

304. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 272.
305. Id. at 270–71; Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1367.
306. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 262 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 47 U.S. 340, 349–50
(1984)).
307. Id. at 274–75.
308. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).
309. Id.
310. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Parts II.A.2–3 (discussing the precedential holdings of NHK and Fintiv and
how these holdings have been applied to later cases).
312. Cuozzo, 579 U.S. at 275.
313. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
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Based on current precedent, the Court should find that an appeal
challenging the NHK-Fintiv factors is reviewable under both § 314(d) and
§ 1295.
2. Validity Under the Administrative Procedure Act
The PTAB’s introduction of discretionary denial is invalid under the APA
for failing to undergo the proper rulemaking process. Additionally, the
discretionary-denial practice fails under a Chevron analysis.314
a. Improper Rulemaking Analysis
The PTAB engaged in improper rulemaking when setting the precedent
for discretionary denial of IPR through the NHK-Fintiv factors. As the court
held in American Mining,315 fulfilling any one of the four factors means that
the agency enacted a new legislative rule rather than an interpretative rule.316
New legislative rules must fulfill the rulemaking procedures laid out in
5 U.S.C. § 553.317
The discretionary-denial practice fulfills the first and fourth factors of
American Mining. As to the first factor, this Note argues that there would be
an inadequate basis for enforcement absent the PTAB’s precedential
opinions setting the NHK-Fintiv factors. Prior to the NHK and Fintiv
opinions, the rate of discretionary denial of petitions at the PTAB was
relatively steady.318 After 2019, when NHK was made precedential, and
2020, when Fintiv was made precedential, the denials of IPR petitions at the
PTAB “explo[ded],” with only 12.5 percent of denials at the PTAB being
based on procedural issues in 2019 versus about 20 percent in 2020—an
increase of 60 percent, even in the face of delayed trial dates due to the
pandemic.319 The establishment of the precedential opinions of NHK and
Fintiv significantly affected the PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial of
IPR petitions. As to the fourth American Mining factor, the NHK-Fintiv
factors also changed the procedure for instituting IPR, as set out in 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.108. Section 42.108 provides that (1) if the PTAB institutes review, it
will do so on all of the claims asserted in the petition;320 (2) the PTAB may
deny review prior to institution;321 and (3) IPR shall not be instituted unless
the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim

314. See supra Part I.C.
315. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
316. Id. at 1112.
317. See supra Part I.C.
318. Britain Eakin, PTAB Discretionary Denials Harming Patent System, Atty Says,
LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1332942/ptabdiscretionary-denials-harming-patent-system-atty-says [https://perma.cc/Y5A6-YKLZ].
319. Dani Kass, PTAB Discretionary Denials Up 60%, Unified Patents States, LAW360
(Jan. 7, 2021, 9:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1342685/ptab-discretionarydenials-up-60-unified-patents-says [https://perma.cc/U4QL-CS3M].
320. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).
321. Id. § 42.108(b).
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challenged in the petition is unpatentable.322 The rule for instituting IPR laid
out in the CFR does not contemplate discretionary denial based on the
NHK-Fintiv factors; in fact, it does not allow the PTAB to consider external
factors outside of the documents filed with the IPR proceeding at all.323
Thus, the NHK-Fintiv factors should be considered a new legislative rule,
and not an interpretation of the existing rule for instituting IPR.
Since the NHK-Fintiv factors establish a new rule, they should have been
adopted according to the criteria under § 553, which requires
notice-and-comment rulemaking.324 However, the NHK-Fintiv factors were
adopted in an adjudicative proceeding at the PTAB, not through
rulemaking.325 The adoption of this procedure was therefore improper.
b. Chevron Analysis
This Note also argues that, based on a Chevron analysis, the PTAB
exceeded its statutory authority. The PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial
is reviewable under Chevron because the Mead test is satisfied. Then, under
the first step of the Chevron analysis, this Note argues that Congress was not
ambiguous in the USPTO’s organic statute regarding the requirements for
instituting IPR. Even if the organic statute were ambiguous, the PTAB’s
interpretation was beyond the statute’s parameters.
The PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial satisfies both factors of a
Mead analysis.326 Regarding the first factor, Congress delegated the
authority to the PTAB to conduct IPR proceedings with the passage of the
AIA.327 As to the second factor, the PTAB’s actions carry the force of law
because the discretionary-denial procedure has the effect of a new legislative
rule, based on the American Mining analysis.328 Chevron is therefore
applicable to the PTAB’s discretionary-denial practice.
Under step one of Chevron, this Note argues that Congress spoke directly
to the issue of how IPRs should be conducted. The PTAB has argued that
the NHK-Fintiv factors have a basis in the organic statute,329 but the PTAB
has only relied on the word “may” in § 314(a): “The Director may not
authorize an inter partes review to be instituted” unless the reasonable
likelihood standard is met.330 According to the PTAB, use of the word “may”
here indicates that the director has explicit, unfettered discretion in

322. Id. § 42.108(c).
323. Id. § 42.108.
324. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
325. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C.1.
326. See supra Part I.C.
327. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. In particular, § 316(c) states, “The Patent Trial and Appeal
Board shall, in accordance with section 6, conduct each inter partes review instituted under
this chapter.” Id. § 316(c).
328. See supra Part I.C.
329. See supra Part II.A.3.
330. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added).
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determining whether to institute IPR.331 However, when considering the
surrounding provisions of the statute and its legislative history, it is clear that
Congress did not intend for unlimited discretion.
It is true that institution of IPR is not required if the statutory requirements
for the petition are met. In fact, Congress explicitly gave the PTAB the
discretion to deny institution of IPR when there is overlap with another
proceeding pending at the PTAB.332 In doing so, Congress used the word
“may” to state that the director “may . . . stay, transfer, consolidat[e], or
terminat[e]” the proceeding.333 The PTAB is neither required to nor is
prohibited from instituting IPR when there is an overlap in proceedings at the
PTAB; the director may choose how to handle a petition for IPR in such
cases.334
However, nowhere in the statute does Congress give the PTAB power to
exercise such discretion in cases involving overlapping proceedings outside
of the PTAB, such as in a parallel litigation. It is clear that Congress
considered and was well aware that such proceedings may exist because it
barred institution of IPR if the petitioner was the same party who initiated a
civil action,335 and because it created an estoppel provision preventing a
petitioner who had received a final written decision in an IPR from raising
the same grounds raised during the IPR in a civil action.336 Furthermore,
these provisions make clear that the use of the phrase “may not” does not
grant discretion to the PTAB. Congress clearly intended to bar IPR if the
petitioner was the party who initiated the civil suit, since this subsection is
titled “Inter partes review barred by civil action,” yet the text of the statute
states that “inter partes review may not be instituted.”337 Similarly, in the
estoppel provision, the statute provides that “the petitioner[] may not assert”
the same grounds raised during IPR in a civil suit.338 The use of the phrase
“may not” in these sections matches its use in § 314(a), which provides that

331. See, e.g., Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, at
15 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017); see also Sayres, supra note 129, at 544.
332. 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (“[I]f another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before
the Office, the Director may determine the manner in which the inter partes review or other
proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for stay, transfer, consolidation, or
termination of any such matter or proceeding.”); see also id. § 325(d) (stating that, with
regards to post-grant review, “if another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before
the Office, the Director may determine the manner in which the post-grant review or other
proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for the stay, transfer, consolidation, or
termination of any such matter or proceeding," and that, “[i]n determining whether to institute
or order a proceeding . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition
or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were
presented to the Office”).
333. Id. § 315(d).
334. Id.
335. Id. § 315(a)(1) (emphasis added).
336. Id. § 315(e)(2).
337. Id. § 315(a)(1) (emphasis added).
338. Id. § 315(e)(2) (emphasis added).
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the “Director may not authorize.”339 Thus, the text of the statute is clear
regarding Congress’s intent.
The legislative history of the AIA further supports the assertion that no
such discretion exists in the organic statute. Part of the motivation behind
introducing the IPR and other post-grant procedures in the AIA was to
address the problems of low-quality patents and infringement suits brought
by NPEs by improving the administrative procedures available at the
USPTO.340 In particular, the legislative history shows that representatives
aimed to “improve administrative processes so that disputes over patents can
be resolved quickly and cheaply without patents being tied up for years in
expensive litigation,”341 and that IPR was “intended to serve as a
less-expensive alternative to courtroom litigation and provide additional
access to the expertise of the Patent Office on questions of patentability.”342
These statements, in addition to the fact that the inter partes reexamination
that preceded IPR was rarely used, show that at least one reason for the
introduction of the IPR procedure was to make patent validity challenges
more available and accessible without needing to engage in expensive
litigation. The PTAB’s practice of discretionary denial stifles this purpose
of the IPR by making the procedure less accessible.
Even if the organic statute were arguably ambiguous, validity of the
PTAB’s discretionary-denial practice still fails under the second step of
Chevron. If the Supreme Court were to construe the word “may” as creating
ambiguity, the PTAB’s current interpretation of such ambiguity would still
exceed its statutory authority. At best, the word “may” suggests that the
PTAB is not absolutely required to institute IPR. However, as discussed with
regards to step one of the Chevron analysis, Congress already delineated
particular instances in which the PTAB should consider any parallel civil
suits in evaluating the terms of IPR procedure. The word “may,” by itself, is
insufficient to grant unfettered discretion to the PTAB to conduct IPR
however it chooses without regard to the organic statute. The PTAB’s
interpretation of the statute should therefore be held to be improper under
Chevron.
B. Legislative Action
If the Supreme Court does not choose to review the validity of the PTAB’s
actions, the NHK-Fintiv rule should be reformed via the legislative process.
As discussed in Part II, Congress has already proposed bills to do so, although
the contents of the bills are still being debated.343
The application of the NHK-Fintiv factors currently gives the PTAB too
much discretion in determining whether to institute review, especially when
the petitioner has already met all other statutory requirements. One
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. § 314(a) (emphasis added).
See supra Part I.A; supra notes 59–61, 67–69 and accompanying text.
157 CONG. REC. S5374 (Sept. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
157 CONG. REC. S1352 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark E. Udall).
See supra Part II.C.2.
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particularly problematic application of the NHK-Fintiv factors is when the
PTAB relies on circumstances that can easily change, such as the scheduled
trial date of a pending litigation (or lack thereof). Studies have shown that
the trial dates that the PTAB relies on in determining whether to deny or
institute review usually get pushed back.344 In fact, one study showed that
the trial dates that were relied upon were incorrect in 94.1 percent of the cases
reviewed.345 The recent memorandum issued by the director even
recognized the unreliability of trial dates.346
At the same time, taking away the PTAB’s power to exercise discretion
completely may be too inflexible and impractical for an administrative
agency that has a limited amount of time and resources.347 Such a rule could
impose significant burdens on the PTAB, especially if it must institute review
based on all claims raised in a petition.348
One general concern that stakeholders have voiced about IPRs is the risk
of duplicative proceedings, in that AIA procedures increase the likelihood of
duplicative proceedings concerning a single patent—one at the USPTO and
another in district court.349 The PTAB’s application of the NHK-Fintiv
factors could reduce the number of duplicative proceedings. However, the
AIA already contemplated duplicative proceedings and included several
provisions to reduce the likelihood of these proceedings. For example, in the
instance that the accused infringer initiates both federal litigation and a
proceeding at the PTAB, the PTAB is barred from instituting the
proceeding.350 The AIA also bars a defendant from seeking IPR if more than
a year has passed since being served with notice in the federal suit.351 Lastly,
a party that receives a final written decision in an IPR or PGR is estopped
from asserting any grounds of invalidity in litigation that “the petitioner
raised or reasonably could have raised” during the PTAB proceeding.352 The
addition of the NHK-Fintiv factors to these provisions would take these
measures far beyond the limits that Congress already imposed on the use of
duplicative proceedings at the PTAB and in the courts.
As far as impact on the market, stakeholders have been split on the benefits
of discretionary denial under the NHK-Fintiv factors and how exactly the
344. Scott McKeown, District Court Trial Dates to Slip After PTAB Discretionary Denials,
ROPES & GRAY (July 24, 2020), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/district-court-trial-datestend-to-slip-after-ptab-discretionary-denials/ [https://perma.cc/K393-FRJX]; Dani Kass,
Fintiv Fails: PTAB Uses ‘Remarkably Inaccurate’ Trial Dates, LAW360 (Nov. 2, 2021,
9:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1436071/fintiv-fails-ptab-uses-remarkablyinaccurate-trial-dates [https://perma.cc/NR9P-ZHM3].
345. Kass, supra note 344.
346. See supra notes 276, 280 and accompanying text.
347. As discussed in Part I.B, the PTAB only has twelve months, extendable by up to six
months, to issue a final written decision after IPR is instituted. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text. The PTAB also cited its “finite resources” as a factor for consideration
in the Fintiv case. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part II.A.1.
349. Layne-Farrar, supra note 69.
350. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (inter partes review); id. § 325(a) (post-grant review).
351. Id. § 315(b).
352. Id. § 315(e)(2).
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procedure should be modified. For instance, the Association for Accessible
Medicines said that codifying Fintiv would make it more difficult for
petitioners to effectively challenge competition-stifling patents, which would
drive up drug prices.353 Meanwhile, the Biotechnology Innovation
Organization argued that doing away with the Fintiv factors would encourage
duplicative and redundant litigation.354 Even two organizations with similar
goals, such as reducing drug prices, can hold conflicting views on Fintiv.
This Note proposes that Congress enact legislation that is similar to
Senator Leahy’s first proposed bill, but that gives the PTAB more leeway
than originally suggested. The legislation should allow the PTAB to consider
how much the district court has already invested in the proceeding by looking
to concrete evidence that is not subject to change and that would reduce the
waste of duplicative efforts at the PTAB. For example, the PTAB should be
able to consider whether the district court litigation is substantially near
completion—such as having already undergone substantial discovery or
briefing—but should not be able to consider circumstances which are subject
to change, such as trial dates. The legislation should also specify that the
PTAB should not be able to consider the merits of the petition when
exercising discretionary denial because the merits are captured in the
reasonable likelihood threshold, and the PTAB’s actions have impermissibly
raised that standard. Adopting Senator Leahy’s bill with the modifications
suggested by this Note would significantly reduce the uncertainty and
unpredictability associated with application of the NHK-Fintiv factors. The
PTAB would only be able to consider concrete, objective evidence of efforts
expended in the district court proceeding, which would be known at the time
of filing the petition. At the same time, this rule would allow the PTAB to
conserve resources by avoiding duplication of efforts in the courts.
Some may argue that legislative action is not necessary, and that we should
just wait for the PTAB to stabilize its policy. There is some evidence that
stakeholders’ fears over the application of the NHK-Fintiv factors could wane
as the PTAB’s reliance on its discretion wanes over time. Fintiv denials have
declined over the six-month period from April to October 2021, according to
data from Unified Patents, a member-based organization working to deter
abusive patent assertions.355 The reason for this decline may be that
petitioners have adapted to the rule by filing petitions much earlier, and the
PTAB has noted and credited petitioner diligence.356 The PTAB’s shift
could also be a result of the scrutiny that its discretion has been receiving
from litigants and lawmakers.357
353. Britain Eakin, As Attys Sharpen PTAB Strategies, Fintiv Denials Are Falling, LAW360
(Oct. 27, 2021, 5:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1434925/as-attys-sharpen-ptabstrategies-fintiv-denials-are-falling [https://perma.cc/G7WA-FSET].
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. (“[T]he board is obviously watching what’s happening outside of the PTO, and
when they do apply Fintiv, trying to make sure they’re analyzing all the facts and getting it
right at the institution decision.”).

644

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Nevertheless, it is likely that, as long as the NHK-Fintiv factors remain in
use, stakeholders will continue to argue over the lawfulness and
appropriateness of the procedure. Now that so much attention is focused on
the PTAB’s practices, and Senator Leahy’s bill has been introduced, it would
be prudent for Congress to amend the bill as proposed by this Note, and in
doing so, reduce the uncertainty that patent owners and petitioners face
during the IPR procedure.
CONCLUSION
The inter partes review is an important administrative procedure for
reviewing validity challenges to patents as an alternative to litigation. The
PTAB’s recent practice of discretionary denial of IPR institution based on
the NHK-Fintiv factors has had significant effects on the way that the
procedure is conducted, as well as stakeholders’ expectations regarding the
process. In order to restore confidence in the procedure, it is important that
either the Supreme Court or Congress act to reduce uncertainty and address
the PTAB’s discretionary-denial practice.
Should the Court take up a challenge to the procedure, it should hold that
the NHK-Fintiv factors exceed the PTAB’s statutory authority and are
invalid. Regardless of the outcome of this potential challenge, Congress
should step in to modify the practice by limiting the PTAB’s discretion to
considering only the number of resources that any parallel litigation has
already expended. The PTAB should not be allowed to consider the merits
of the petition, nor variable factors such as the scheduled trial date. This
would reduce uncertainty at the PTAB while recognizing that the agency has
limited time and resources. Furthermore, legislation would put patent
owners’ minds at ease while still leaving enough room for challengers to
attack wrongfully granted patents. This would improve the U.S. patent
system overall by making patent protection more robust, as well as benefit
stakeholders, the PTAB, and the courts by providing stability.

